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Abstract 
This paper surveys fundamental contrasts in the articulation of international authority using a new 
dataset, constructed by the authors, that estimates the composition and decision-making rules of 72 
international organizations from 1950 to 2010. We theorize that two modes of governance – general 
purpose and task specific – represent distinctive ways of organizing political life, and this has stark 
implications for the exercise of international authority. We engage theoretical perspectives that bridge 
rational and constructivist approaches to examine how general purpose and task specific international 
organizations exhibit systematic differences in their institutional configuration, delegation, pooling, 
and development. 
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1. Introduction* 
There are many ways to reap scale beyond the national state – empires, leagues, confederations, 
alliances, and international agreements – but international governmental organizations are distinctive. 
They are voluntary (unlike empires and all other hierarchical forms of governance), have a 
differentiated and generally more permanent institutional structure (unlike alliances and international 
agreements), and have an independent capacity for rule making (unlike leagues or confederations). 
Beyond these characteristics, there is wide variation. Some international organizations (IOs) have just 
a few member states; others are global in their coverage. Some focus on a single policy area; others 
have extremely broad policy portfolios. Some have a diversified institutional architecture; others are 
fairly simple in their institutional organization. Some appear to be relatively fixed in their organization 
and membership, while others change considerably over time.  
The premise of this article is that the diversity of international organization can be explained as a 
response to the tension between scale and community in the provision of public goods. On the one 
hand, interactions among national communities produce externalities and, therefore, demand for 
transnational public goods (Deutsch 1953; Marks 2012). International jurisdictions that have a 
capacity for continuous information gathering and negotiation are vital for managing problems that 
transcend national communities. Larger jurisdictions can provide pure public goods, including 
economic exchange, at lower cost, and they can internalize policy consequences over a larger 
population. From this standpoint international organizations can be conceived as functional institutions 
that reap the benefits of scale for the provision of public goods.  
But the willingness to sustain an IO depends on more than its functional benefits. Governance is an 
expression of community and expresses the desire of territorially concentrated groups of people with 
distinctive histories, institutions and preferences to rule themselves. People care deeply about who 
exercises authority over them, and we argue that this exerts a powerful constraint on governance 
beyond the state (Hooghe/Marks 2009a). Community is much stronger within, than among, states. 
Hence the dilemma for governance among states is to gain the benefits of scale while adjusting 
governance to the shallowness of transnational community. To what extent are states willing to 
commit themselves to incomplete contracts that delegate authority over a broad, but unspecified, range 
of policy areas? How prepared are they to delegate authority to independent non-state actors? Under 
what circumstances will they be willing to bind themselves to majority rule?  
Our argument is that there are two contrasting approaches to institutional cooperation among states 
(Hooghe/Marks 2003, 2010; Enderlein et al. 2010; Hasenclever et al. 1997; Peters et al. 2012, p. 18). 
The first reproduces general purpose government at the international level by engaging the manifold 
problems that confront a given set of countries as they interact. General purpose (Type 1) IOs express 
a sense of shared purpose among their members. They bundle the provision of public goods for a 
particular transnational community and, accordingly, they are broad in policy scope. Such IOs may 
deal with security issues alongside trade issues, or they may engage not just environmental problems 
for a given community, but a variety of other issues such as culture, transport, human rights, disease, 
or migration. 
                                                     
*
 This paper is forthcoming as Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Liesbet Hooghe, and Gary Marks, "Patterns of International 
Organization: Task Specific vs. General Purpose, Politische Vierteljahresschrift. 
 The authors acknowledge support from the European Research Council Advanced Grant #249543 “Causes and 
Consequences of Multilevel Governance.” Earlier versions of the paper were presented at an authors’ workshop held in 
Potsdam in November 2013, the International Studies Association in Toronto, March 2014, and a workshop on 
“Multilevel Governance above the State” held in Delmenhorst, July 2014. We thank the participants at these events for 
comments, with special thanks to Thomas Gehring, Julia Gray, Yoram Haftel, Duncan Snidal, Jonas Tallberg, and 
Michael Zürn. This paper was prepared for a special issue on international organization for the Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift. 
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Table 1: Modes of international organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second approach is to decompose problems so that they can be handled independently. Task 
specific (Type 2) IOs are rooted not in shared communities, but in shared problems. Each task specific 
IO is created to solve a particular cooperation problem in a specific policy domain such as trade, air 
traffic control, food safety, or security. The idea is to parse policy problems into functionally discrete 
pieces which are connected only in the medium, but not in the short, term so that each may be dealt 
with in a separate organization (Simon 1996). 
Our purpose in this article is to show a) that the tension between community and scale incentivizes 
the choice between general purpose and task specific governance and b) that this choice has 
fundamental consequences for institutional design. Task specific IOs have much larger memberships 
than general purpose IOs. They are much more likely to have majoritarian decision-making rules. 
Their institutional structure is simpler, and they tend to delegate less to non-state bodies. And they are 
much less likely to be reformed after they have been set up.  
Beyond its validity, a theory can be valuable if it suggests that a phenomenon, which was taken for 
granted, is puzzling and worthy of explanation. Why are so many institutional features of international 
organizations – including the scale of their memberships, the scope of their policy portfolios, the 
extent to which they delegate authority to independent bodies, the extent to which they pool authority 
in majoritarian decision-making, the frequency with which they are reformed – not normally 
distributed around their respective means? Does the apparently bimodal character of international 
organization have a general explanation?  
To tackle this problem we need reasonably good comparative information about the institutional 
characteristics of IOs. The qualities we are interested in – policy scope, delegation, pooling, 
institutional reform – are abstract concepts that cannot be directly observed. We need therefore to 
make a series of conceptual and measurement decisions to produce data that can discipline the 
generalizations we wish to put on the table.  
In the next section we conceptualize how international organizations exercise authority through 
independent non-state bodies (delegation) and through intergovernmental bodies that make collective 
decisions (pooling). We then model the composition of IO bodies and how they make decisions to 
estimate delegation and pooling in 72 IOs from 1950-2010. In subsequent sections we use this 
information to explain how the institutional structures of IOs vary cross-sectionally and over time.  
Delegation and Pooling 
We conceive of IO authority as two-sided. Member states can delegate authority to independent 
bodies – a general secretariat, independent executive, assembly, and court. And/or member states can 
pool authority among themselves in majoritarian or quasi-majoritarian procedures. Previous research 
finds that these two forms of IO authority are independent of each other (Hooghe/Marks 2014), and 
we need therefore to estimate them separately. The distinction between delegation and pooling is the 
General purpose IO 
(Type 1 governance) 
Task specific IO 
(Type 2 governance) 
broad policy scope narrow policy scope 
community driven problem driven 
bundle public goods decompose public goods 
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bedrock of our measurement and our theory, but it is worth emphasizing that while the concepts have 
not been used to estimate or theorize international organizations, they are not new.  
Conceptualization 
The distinction between delegation and pooling first appeared in research on the European Community 
(EC). Keohane and Hoffmann (1991, p. 16 and p. 7) observe that the EC is an example of 
“supranationality without supranational institutions” because member states pool, but do not delegate, 
authority. Moravcsik (1993, p. 506) refers to the concepts “delegation and pooling” in tandem to 
encompass the authority exercised by the EC. Subsequent uses of the terms also employed them in 
combination to encompass the ways in which the European Union exercises authority (Hooghe/Marks 
2001; Kohler-Koch/Rittberger 2007; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006).
1
 
The assumption that they are closely related was explicitly questioned by Lake (2007, p. 220). Lake 
did not seek to assess the conditions under which pooling or delegation take place, but explained that 
they are conceptually distinct because they involve contrasting strategic imperatives. Whereas the 
strategic problem in delegating authority to an independent body is shirking in which the agent 
pursues its own agenda, the strategic problem in pooling authority is that of collective decision-
making where a member state may be outvoted under majoritarian decision rules. However, as Lake 
notes, the distinction is by-passed in analyses which extend the concept of delegation to include 
pooling or which view international organization through the lens of the principal-agent perspective. 
The upshot is that our understanding of the contrasting logics of delegation and pooling is embryonic.  
Estimation 
In order to estimate the delegation and pooling of formal authority in international organizations, we 
need to pay detailed attention to actors making decisions under rules.
2
 With respect to the actors, we 
wish to know the extent to which the bodies that shape the agenda and make decisions are controlled 
by states. Pooling is the domain of interstate bodies – bodies entirely or primarily composed of 
member state representatives. Delegation is the domain of non-state bodies – general secretariats, 
consultative bodies, assemblies, executives, judicial bodies. With respect to rules, we wish to know 
how the interaction of voting rules and decision-making bodies empower or constrain states 
                                                     
1
 The distinction is implied in the legalization (Abbott et al. 2000) and rational design projects (Koremenos et al. 2001). 
Abbott and Snidal (1998, p. 8f) use the concept of centralization to refer to “a concrete and stable organizational structure 
and a supportive administrative apparatus” while independence refers to “the authority to act with a degree of autonomy, 
and often with neutrality, in defined spheres.” These attributes have an affinity with our concept of delegation. 
Koremenos et al. (2001) identify five elements of institutional design: membership rules, scope of issues, flexibility, 
centralization of tasks, and rules for controlling the institution. The final two overlap with delegation and pooling. 
Centralization refers to activities “to disseminate information, to reduce bargaining and transaction costs, and to enhance 
enforcement . . . The least intrusive form of centralization is information collection” (pp. 771-2). Control “focus[es] on 
voting arrangements as one important and observable aspect of control” (p. 772). Recently, several researchers have 
begun to operationalize delegation, autonomy, or independence of international organizations (Conceiçao-Heldt 2013; 
Ege and Bauer 2013; Gehring 2013). 
2
 We investigate the formal rules and then determine whether these are translated into institutions in order to narrow the 
gap in coding between unrealized intention and actual practice (Gray and Slapin 2012; Haftel 2013). However, we do not 
code practices that have only an informal basis. The studies closest to ours are Blake and Lockwood Payton (2014), who 
estimate pooling by examining the voting rule in the IO body that they judge to be the most consequential in setting 
policy, Haftel and Thompson (2006), who propose a four-item additive index of IO independence in regional 
organizations that includes voting in the council of ministers (an element of pooling) and right of initiative by the 
bureaucracy (an element of delegation), and Goertz and Powers (2011, 2012) who map basic features of the institutional 
structure of “regional economic institutions” along five dimensions. Each of these studies has produced a dataset on the 
institutional design of IOs. We extend their efforts by encompassing a wide range of IOs over a 60-year period, and by 
developing a multi-faceted measurement instrument that estimates both the extent to which IO bodies are independent 
and their decision-making across a range of fields. 
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individually and collectively. Unanimity decision-making imposes no constraints on individual states, 
but hampers collective decision-making. Majoritarianism, in contrast, constrains states individually 
because they lose their ability to veto undesired decisions, but it facilitates collective decision-making. 
With respect to decisions, we wish to know the depth of obligation – how binding they are for states 
and whether they require ratification. We examine actors, rules, and decisions in six substantive fields: 
membership accession, membership suspension or expulsion, policy making, drafting the budget, 
budgetary non-compliance, and constitutional reform. Finally, we evaluate third-party dispute 
settlement in a separate analysis. We apply this schema to 72 IOs with standing in world politics from 
1950 and 2010 (listed in Appendix I).
3
 
We conceive of delegation as a transfer of authority from member states to a non-state IO body. 
Institutionally, this is most often to a general secretariat. However, member states can also cede 
control to other bodies that are partially or fully composed of non-governmental actors, such as 
transnational actors, elected public officials, experts, or judges. Our measure considers each of these 
possibilities. However, it excludes transfer of authority to bodies outside the IO, such as other 
international organizations or non-member national states. 
Delegation is an additive index encompassing agenda setting, decision-making, and dispute 
settlement for each year of an IO’s existence. It is the grant of authority by member states to a) 
organized bodies (general secretariat, consultative bodies, assemblies, executives, judicial bodies) b) 
that are non-state
4
 and c) play a role in agenda setting or final decision-making in d) one or several of 
the six decision areas listed above. The extent of delegation is a function of the number of non-state 
bodies and the number of decision areas in which they play a formal role. In dispute settlement, which 
we examine separately, delegation is a function of the extent to which third-party judicial bodies are 
independent of member state control, render binding rulings, and non-state actors have access to the 
body. We estimate each element separately, standardize, and sum in an additive index. 
Pooling is an additive index tapping the extent to which authority is transferred from individual 
member states to a collective member state body in agenda setting and decision-making for each year 
of an IO’s existence. Three elements are included in our assessment of the extent to which member 
states pool authority: first, whether the decision rule departs from unanimity to some form of 
majoritarianism; second, whether the decision is binding rather than voluntary; third, whether the 
decision comes into force without requiring ratification by individual member states. We estimate the 
extent to which member states pool authority by assessing voting rules, bindingness, and ratification in 
the same six domains listed above. The weakest link (i.e. the most intergovernmental option) prevails 
in each decision domain. So if two or more member state bodies are involved in a decision, we 
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 The population consists of international governmental organizations that fulfill a minimum of five of the following six 
criteria:  
 • three or more member states  
 • a formal constitution or convention  
 • a legislative body, executive, and administration  
 • a permanent staff of 50 or more  
 • at least one annual meeting of the executive or legislature  
 • address and website.  
 We see two reasons for limiting the sample to IOs that have standing in international politics. The first is practical. Our 
theory requires us to evaluate IOs using much more information than available in any prior dataset, and given time and 
financial constraints it makes sense to estimate IOs that have a more detectable footprint in the primary and secondary 
records. Hence our decision to exclude IOs that have no website, address, or are poorly staffed. Second, while we think 
our theory might apply very broadly, we suspect that states may be more likely to pay attention to IOs that have some 
minimal level of resources. 
4
 A body is non-state when a) the members are primarily or wholly selected by national parliaments, regional or local 
governments, trade unions or business associations, or other interest groups, or b) member state representation is indirect, 
that is, representatives are formally prohibited from receiving voting instructions from their government, or they take an 
oath of independence. 
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consider the rules that govern the most intergovernmental body. The maximum score is majority 
voting over a binding decision without ratification. The minimum score is unanimous decision-
making, followed by nonbinding decision-making under supermajority, followed by ratification by all 
member states under supermajority. Supermajoritarian decision rules, partial ratification, and partial 
bindingness produce intermediate scores. Scores for each domain – agenda setting and final decision – 
are treated as elements of a summated rating scale.
5
  
Patterns of International Organization 
We argue that the tension between community and scale shapes incentives over the basic form of 
cooperation and this is reflected in the size of an IO’s membership, its decision rules, its institutional 
architecture and evolution, and the authority delegated to non-state bodies.  
General purpose and task specific IOs are distinguished, above all, by the breadth of their policy 
portfolios. We estimate this by examining IO involvement in 25 policy areas listed in Appendix II. As 
Figure 1 illustrates, the distribution is bimodal. Twenty-eight IOs in our sample handle eleven or more 
policies on this list, and 44 handle eight or fewer policies. The median general purpose IO handles 15 
policies and the median task specific IO handles three. These numbers can be considered upper bounds 
because our measure is designed to be sensitive; it detects five distinct forms of IO policy involvement 
and does so for a refined set of policies.  
  
                                                     
5
 The two dimensions of authority – pooling and delegation – are weakly correlated (0.06). The coding scheme was honed 
over iterated rounds of independent coding by two graduate-faculty teams using a subset of organizations. The final 
coding scheme was applied by six researchers, two of whom had guided the project from day one. Coding decisions are 
set out and documented in profiles (around 4,500 words for each IO). The full coding scheme is available here: 
http://www.falw.vu/~mlg/igo.html.  
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Figure 1: Policy scope for general purpose and task specific organizations
6
  
 
 
Note: N=72 for 2010. Policy scope is estimated on a 1-25 scale (Appendix II). 
General purpose and task specific IOs relate to their constituencies differently, and this shapes the 
scale of their membership. General purpose IOs handle the problems that confront a given set of 
peoples as they interact across national borders. Consequently, they are formed by states whose 
peoples have some mutuality of expectations underpinning a shared sense of purpose. They require 
what Elinor Ostrom (2005) describes as “shared mental maps” – a bed of common understandings that 
facilitate convergent interpretation of behavior. This eases open-ended cooperation based on highly 
incomplete contracts, which require not only that other members believe one’s promises but also that 
they understand one’s promises (Gibbons and Henderson 2012, p. 1351). Almost all general purpose 
IOs are composed of contiguous member states.
7
 The exceptions are illuminating. The Organization of 
the Islamic Conference unites countries in North Africa, the Arab world, and East Asia, where Islam 
provides a shared sense of purpose. The Commonwealth encompasses countries that were formerly 
part of the British imperial orbit, and the United Nations is the only IO that is involved in more than 
eleven policies but which has a frail community basis.  
Task specific organizations are less restrictive over membership but more restrictive over policy. 
They handle policies that can be isolated from the pack and which are amenable to technical solutions. 
Task specific IOs are problem driven, and this relieves them from the community conditions required 
for general purpose governance. Their forte is encompassing all those who are affected by a problem. 
Hence task specific governance is predominant in dealing with problems that have global externalities 
and a correspondingly weak community basis. The only large-member organization in Figure 2 that is 
not task specific is the United Nations. However, task specific IOs are not necessarily global. Some 
task specific IOs handle regional problems that are amenable to independent management. For 
                                                     
6
 The data contained in this article are presented in more extensive form in Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Tobias Lenz, 
Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, and Svet Derderyan. 2015. Scale and Community. The Design of International 
Organizations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
7
 Or adjacent island states in, for example, the Pacific Islands Forum and the South Pacific Commission. 
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example, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR) regulates social rights and 
environmental externalities related to shipping on the Rhine. The Organization of Petroleum-
Exporting Countries (OPEC) coordinates production and price setting among oil-exporting economies. 
The Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF) sets standards for 
railways in Europe and contiguous countries in Central Asia and the Middle East. In our theory, these 
organizations share more with other task specific IOs than with other IOs that can be labelled 
“regional.” 
Figure 2: Size of membership in general purpose and task specific organizations 
 
Note: N=72, year=2010. Source: COW (with minor corrections). 
Contrasts in pooling 
Pooling of authority is primarily a property of task specific IOs. Figure 3a breaks down the incidence 
of majoritarian decision-making across six policy areas for task specific and general purpose IOs for 
2010. Fifty-five percent of the task specific IOs have pooling in five or six policy areas against just 
eleven percent of general purpose IOs.  
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Figure 3a: Pooling across policy areas in 2010. N = 72. 
 
Note: Darker colors reflect the number of policy areas from a maximum of six (membership accession, 
membership suspension, policy making, drafting the budget, budgetary non-compliance, constitutional reform) 
in which an IO pools authority. 
This contrast persists over time. Figure 3b shows the trends in pooling for the 18 general purpose and 
33 task specific IOs that have existed since 1975. Pooling edges up slightly for general purpose IOs 
after 2000, but the gap remains substantial.  
Two factors combine to limit the pooling of authority in general purpose IOs and increase it in task 
specific IOs. The first arises because general purpose IOs are far more likely to engage issues of 
domestic concern to national governments, and this makes the member states much less willing to 
sacrifice the national veto (Hooghe/Marks 2009b; Zürn et al. 2012; see also Rixen/Zangl 2012). IOs 
like to portray themselves as “being impersonal and neutral, that is, that they are not exercising power 
but instead are using impartial, objective, and value-neutral knowledge to serve others” 
(Barnett/Coleman 2005, p. 598). This becomes more difficult as IO decisions reach into member 
states. The cloak of technocratic detachment fades when an IO allocates scarce resources across 
competing domestic interests. Most member state governments have legitimacy over issues considered 
to be matters of diplomacy, but this does not extend to international agreements that have domestic 
repercussions. It is all too easy for populists to frame the domestic debate over a controversial IO 
decision as the defense of national sovereignty against foreign interference (Hooghe/Marks 2009b).
8
 
No wonder that national governments are intent on maintaining the national veto in IOs that are 
perceived to affect their domestic support. 
  
                                                     
8
 Task specific IOs sometimes take decisions that cause domestic disquiet and even revolt – e.g. the IMF in Argentina, 
Mexico, or Thailand; the IAEA in Iran or North Korea – but these effects are felt in states that are the object of IO 
decision-making, rather than the member states that decide the policy. 
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Figure 3b: Trends in pooling 1975 – 2010. N = 51. 
 
Historically, task specific IOs have been at the forefront of pooling authority in majoritarian decisions. 
Stephen Zamora, a historian of international organization, stresses that supranational decision-making 
was most palatable in IOs that dealt with specialized issues which did not much impinge on domestic 
policy. The first departures from unanimity voting were introduced in the international technical 
unions established during the 19th and early 20th centuries, the first being the International 
Telegraphic Union (ITU) in 1865, which was then the largest international organization with 15 
members. By 1914, several organizations, including the Universal Postal Union with 33 members and 
the International Institute of Agriculture (forerunner of the Food and Agricultural Organization) with 
37 members, had introduced majority voting. After the First World War, majority rule spread slowly 
to other new technical unions (Zamora 1980, pp. 574-5).  
The second factor that affects the willingness of member states to pool authority arises from the 
size of its membership. All else equal, the larger the number of veto-wielding decision makers, the 
more difficult it is to craft reform. Task specific IOs face the dilemma that their sheer scale of 
membership will reduce them to talking shops incapable of action. Streamlining decision-making by 
relaxing the national veto is an obvious response. Majoritarian procedures are made more palatable for 
member states when the contract on which the organization is based expressly limits its policy reach or 
when the organization is biased towards technocratic problem solving. 
The two logics of pooling can create huge tensions in a general purpose organization that grows in 
membership. The European Union is a case in point. National governments have been caught in a 
stressful choice between facilitating decision-making and holding on to the national veto. When 
majoritarian procedures have been adopted, this has only been because it appeared to be the least-bad 
response to membership enlargement. The 1985 Dooge committee, which was tasked with making 
proposals for the Single European Act, noted that “more use will need to be made, especially in the 
context of the enlarged Community, of the majority voting provisions laid down in the Treaties” 
(Dooge Committee 1985, p. 14). British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her allies succeeded 
initially in limiting majority voting to the internal market, but efficiency became an overriding concern 
Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks 
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in planning for Eastern enlargement. In December 2001, the Laeken Declaration of the European 
Council launched a Constitutional Convention to overhaul the institutions. It stated bluntly that a  
“key question concerns how we can improve the efficiency of decision-making and the workings 
of the institutions in a Union of some thirty Member States. How could the Union set its objectives 
and priorities more effectively and ensure better implementation? Is there a need for more 
decisions by a qualified majority? How is the co-decision procedure between the Council and the 
European Parliament to be simplified and speeded up?” (European Council 2001, p. 5)  
The outcome was a highly contested redesign of decision-making that involved lowering the threshold 
for qualified majority voting.
9
  
However, it would be misleading to see the EU as indicative of a general trend among general 
purpose IOs towards majoritarianism. The EU is an outlier among general purpose IOs both in terms 
of the extent of its enlargement, from six to 28 (and counting), and in terms of the extent to which it 
has agreed to majoritarian reform. It is no coincidence that the EU is also an outlier in terms of the 
domestic political resistance that it has generated.  
Institutional architecture 
General purpose and task specific IOs differ in their institutional architecture. Almost all IOs have a 
general secretariat with administrative functions, but general purpose organizations tend to have a 
greater range of decision-making assemblies and executive bodies. As Figure 4 indicates, the median 
general purpose organization has four integral bodies compared to three for the median task specific 
organization.
10
 The general purpose organization with the most differentiated institutional architecture 
– the European Union – has seven different bodies. Among the IOs we observe, the League of Arab 
States is the only general purpose organization with only two bodies, whereas there are six task 
specific organizations with just two bodies.
11
  
  
                                                     
9
 This is not to deny that consensus remains the dominant informal decision rule in the EU. Nevertheless, changes in 
formal rules towards majoritarian decision-making condition bargaining dynamics, especially over controversial issues, 
as they shift the burden of justification towards the state that seeks to veto. Whereas formal unanimity grants each state a 
veto that does not require justification, majoritarian decision-making implies that recalcitrant states must convince the 
others to apply the informal consensus rule (on informal IOs, see Vabulas and Snidal 2013). 
10
 Some IOs are supported by a tiered administrative structure, whereby assemblies, executives, or the general secretariat 
are aided by subsidiary committees or groups that prepare decisions, follow up on implementation, or study particular 
aspects. We code only those bodies with some discretion within the IO structure – not auxiliary bodies in a chain of 
command to a higher body. 
11
 The Council of the League of Arab States serves as assembly and executive and is assisted by a general secretariat. 
Among task specific IOs, the European Organization for Nuclear Research and the European Space Agency have an 
assembly and a secretariat, which also serves as executive. The Central Commission on the Navigation of the Rhine, the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, the International Whaling Commission, and the European Free Trade Association have 
councils which double as assemblies and executives. 
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Figure 4: Institutional complexity in 2010  
 
Note: Institutional complexity is estimated as the number of decision making bodies in 
general purpose and task specific organizations in 2010. N = 72. 
The contrast reflects the differing scope of policy competences in general purpose and task specific 
IOs. More diverse policy portfolios may require more differentiated institutional structures. Decision-
making in a general purpose IO is particularly challenging. The organization must frame short and 
medium term objectives, and agree on how best to pursue them. It must prevent issue cycling among 
alternative legislative proposals – a particular danger in the multidimensional issue spaces typical of 
general purpose organizations. It must determine which actors to consult in crafting policies and must 
negotiate substantive commitments. And it must find ways to promote compliance with those 
commitments. Institutions can help in each of these respects by structuring the agenda, supplying and 
processing information, enhancing the credibility of commitments, and monitoring compliance 
(Bradley/Kelley 2008; Hawkins et al. 2006; Koremenos 2007, 2008; Pollack 2003).  
Beyond this, institutions can reduce the uncertainty of incomplete contracting, which is particularly 
pronounced in general purpose IOs. Whereas task specific IOs take on problems that can be quite well 
specified in advance, general purpose IOs operate in a more open-textured environment for they are 
concerned with the problems that arise as peoples interact across national borders. General purpose 
IOs are correspondingly based on highly incomplete contracts that are flexible in responding to 
contingencies that are inherently unpredictable, complicated and consequently too costly to write into 
a contract. Their virtue is flexibility, but this involves ambiguity about the interpretation of rules and it 
deepens the shadow of the future (Hart/Moore 2008; Marks et al. 2014). Independent arbitration 
panels or courts are especially important when there is so much room for disagreement about what 
counts as cooperation and defection. Greater uncertainty about the rules may produce incentives for 
greater institutional complexity beyond rule arbitration. If highly incomplete contracting involves not 
merely rule-based problem solving, but searching and learning, then one may expect institutions to 
play a critical role in discovering as well as realizing cooperation. 
General purpose IOs delegate much more extensively to non-state bodies composed of elected 
parliamentarians as Figure 5 reveals (Cutler 2013; Tallberg et al. 2015). Fifteen of 28 general purpose 
IOs have a parliament compared to five of 44 task specific IOs. Parliamentary bodies are the third 
most prevalent delegated institution among general purpose IOs but the least common among task 
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specific organizations. Moreover, parliaments in general purpose IOs tend to be more authoritative 
than those in task specific IOs. The strongest of all, the European Parliament, co-decides on accession, 
budgetary allocation, and policy making, and it has additional agenda-setting powers on suspension 
and constitutional amendment. The rise of parliaments, like that of independent IO bodies in general, 
has been marked since the 1980s. The only IO in our dataset with a parliamentary body in 1950 was 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. By 1980, seven IOs had parliaments, rising to 22 by 2010. 
The relative paucity of parliamentary bodies in task specific IOs and their abundance in general 
purpose IOs reflects the contrasting ways in which these types of governance seek legitimacy (Lenz 
2012, 2013; see also the contributions in section II). Task specific IOs are in the business of managing 
particular coordination or collaboration dilemmas (Snidal 1985; Zürn 1992). They are oriented chiefly 
to Pareto optimality and are biased towards output legitimacy in which they are evaluated primarily by 
results. To the limited extent that parliamentary bodies in task specific IOs are created at all, they have 
consultative competences only. General purpose organizations, by contrast, engage redistributive as 
well as technical policies, and they have a correspondingly greater need to legitimate their decisions. 
Granting elected national parliamentarians access to supranational decision-making is one way to do 
this. 
Figure 5: Presence and role of parliaments in 2010. N = 72.  
 
Note: Bars indicate the proportion of IOs with a decision-making parliament, a consultative 
parliament, or no parliament. Fifteen of 28 general purpose IOs have a decision making or 
consultative parliament compared to five of 44 task specific IOs.  
Delegation dynamics 
The contrast between general purpose and task specific IOs extends to how they change over time. 
Whereas task specific IOs are designed to fulfill a particular function, general purpose IOs are 
designed to solve problems that confront a given community. General purpose IOs have a broader and 
less precise purpose that leads to greater institutional flexibility. The development of general purpose 
IOs resembles state building in its lack of a master plan – a founding constitution specifying, once and 
for all, the scope and responsibilities of the organization, its institutional make-up, the level of 
resource extraction, or its relations with state and non-state actors (Marks 1997).  
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Both kinds of organization are based on formal contracts among states. All such contracts are 
necessarily incomplete because it is simply not possible to write a contract that can specify “the full 
array of responsibilities and obligations of the contracting parties, as well as anticipate every possible 
future contingency” (Cooley/Spruyt 2009, p. 8). But the contracts that underpin general purpose IOs 
are considerably more incomplete than those that underpin task specific IOs. The treaties for task 
specific organizations have a clearly defined objective oriented to the management of a specific 
cooperation problem, such as lowering barriers to trade or coordinating the use of an international 
common pool resource, and they usually set out in some detail how this objective is to be achieved.  
The founding agreements of general purpose organizations do little more than set out the broad 
parameters for cooperation. They commit their members to open-ended goals – for example, “ever 
closer Union” in the European Community’s Treaty of Rome; the “formation of an Andean 
subregional community” in the Andean Community’s 1974 Cartagena Agreement; or the “creation of 
a homogenous society” in the Economic Community of West African States’ Lagos Treaty. The 
founding contracts of this type of organization emphasize the process rather than the destination of 
cooperation (Marks et al. 2014).  
The implications should be understood in both functional and ideational terms. From a functional 
standpoint, agenda setting in general purpose IOs is unusually complex, and so it is particularly useful 
to set up independent bodies to fill in the details of incomplete contracts, generate expert policy-
relevant information, and monitor compliance (Pollack 2003, p. 378; Bradley and Kelley 2008). A 
general secretariat with the authority to sequence votes can also limit the opportunities for states to 
defect from a winning coalition by making a more attractive offer centered on a different proposal 
(Tallberg 2010). This, in a nutshell, is the notion that incomplete contracting induces states to delegate 
authority to non-state actors to reduce uncertainty and limit issue-cycling (Hawkins et al. 2006; Marks 
et al. 2014; Mueller 2003; Pollack 2003). 
Highly incomplete contracting in a general purpose organization has normative as well as policy 
effects along the lines highlighted by Chayes and Chayes (1993, p. 180):  
“[M]odern treaty making, like legislation in a democratic polity, can be seen as a creative 
enterprise through which the parties not only weigh the benefits and burdens of commitment but 
explore, redefine, and sometimes discover their interests. It is at its best a learning process in 
which not only national positions but also conceptions of national interest evolve.”  
As cooperation progresses, IO decision makers may come to share frames of reference that reduce 
perceptual conflicts and ameliorate fear of exploitation (Acharya 2004; Katzenstein 2005; Wendt 
1999). Barnett and Finnemore (2004, p. 23) find that the authority of international bureaucrats rests on 
“a contrary discourse of states protecting their own national and particularistic interests” and on 
representing “the community against self-seekers.” Other studies find that IO bureaucrats spend most 
of their time bridging the distance between national norms and common solutions and that they are 
best conceived as mediators between national values and international norms. On the basis of a panel 
study of top administrators in the European Commission, Hooghe (2005, p. 862) finds that “top 
officials sustain international norms when national experiences motivate them to do so – when 
national political socialization predisposes them to embrace supranationalism, or when 
supranationalism appears to benefit their country.” These studies find that delegated bodies have a 
dynamic effect in facilitating repeated interaction and developing a normative basis for cooperation 
(see also Koch 2009). 
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Figure 6: Trends in delegation, 1975 – 2010. N = 51.  
 
In line with this, the information we have gathered indicates that the contrast between delegation in 
general purpose and task specific IOs gathers steam over time. In 1975, general purpose IOs have an 
average delegation score of 14.1, rising in 2010 to 27.1 for the same organizations. This is equivalent 
to establishing a standing tribunal with automatic right to review and binding decision-making, or to 
creating two additional consultative bodies and empowering a general secretariat to set the agenda in 
two additional decision areas. By contrast, the average task specific IO has barely budged over time.  
The contrast extends to the frequency of reform. Figure 7 displays the distribution of reforms in the 
two types of organizations. We define an organizational reform as a change in any element of our 
pooling or delegation measure after the founding bargain has been struck. Forty-one percent of task 
specific IOs never undergo reform compared to just seven percent of general purpose IOs. Whereas 
general purpose organizations reform every 15 years on average, task specific ones reform only every 
36 years. 
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Figure 7: Distribution of reforms, 1950 – 2010.  
 
Note: The bars show the number of reforms for each IO since its foundation or since 1950 
(whichever date is later). For example, just 2 general purpose IOs have seen no reform 
compared to 18 task specific IOs. 
Conclusion 
This paper surveys some basic features of international organization using a new dataset, constructed 
by the authors, that estimates 72 IOs from 1950 to 2010. We theorize that the differences one can 
observe among international organizations in their institutional architecture, their decision-making, 
and their institutional trajectory result from the contrasting ways in which human beings confront the 
fundamental dilemma of international governance. There are enormous benefits arising from scale in 
the provision of public goods. Overarching jurisdictions are uniquely able to manage problems that 
stem from interaction among nations and their peoples. Yet the feeling of ‘we-ness’ that underpins 
good government is at best weak. But it is not always absent. The existence of even weak communities 
among nations makes possible general purpose international organization.  
General purpose IOs express a sense of shared purpose among their members. They bundle 
competences for given sets of peoples who, by virtue of their interaction, share a demand for 
transnational public goods. The membership of general purpose IOs is territorially bounded, and 
enlargement is a serious matter requiring debate and consensus. Membership of such an IO involves 
commitments that can affect national sovereignty on a broad front, and their member states are 
generally unwilling to pool their authority in majoritarian decision-making. But general purpose IOs 
discover, as well as implement, cooperation. They are designed to negotiate complex issues, and 
despite the obstacles to reform, they are institutionally flexible.  
Task specific governance is distinctly different. It is problem driven, and is intended to provide 
public goods for a diffusely defined membership that can cover the globe. The legitimacy of task 
specific IOs lies chiefly in their effectiveness in managing problems. They have a correspondingly 
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limited capacity to facilitate distributional bargains, but are oriented to Pareto optimality in which 
every participant is at least no worse off than before. There tends to be less variety in their structure, 
less emphasis on including non-state actors, and less institutional change over time.  
Abstract concepts that have been applied to international organizations are challenging to evaluate 
in empirical analysis. We conceive an IO as a web of rules and we analyze these rules with the help of 
two precisely formulated concepts which describe both the composition and decision-making of IO 
bodies. One dimension of variation arises when IO bodies have conditional independence over certain 
functions, which we conceptualize as delegation. Another arises to the extent that member states make 
collectively binding decisions under majoritarian rules, which we conceptualize as pooling. The 
distinction is mooted in the literature, but has remained theoretically inert. Here the distinction 
motivates both our measurement and theory. 
While majoritarian decision-making is a functionally efficient approach to decision-making among 
states, it is predominant only in task specific organizations. The exception, the European Union, 
reveals just how difficult it is for states to institute majoritarian rules over decisions that are regarded 
as intrinsic to their national political life. Task specific IOs, which are functionally oriented to solving 
particular policy problems, confront the national veto with greater expediency. Pooling authority in 
budgetary allocation and ordinary policy making is very common among task specific IOs but much 
less widespread among general purpose IOs.  
Conversely, general purpose IOs develop considerably higher levels of delegated authority than 
task specific IOs. General purpose IOs are designed to provide public goods on a broad, imprecise, 
front, and this is reflected in their institutional trajectories. Over time, general purpose IOs accumulate 
non-state bodies—strong general secretariats, indirectly or directly elected parliamentary assemblies 
with decision-making power, and consultative bodies of diverse kinds. It is worth noting that such 
institutional complexity is not given at birth, but develops in iterated reform. This suggests that 
general purpose IOs shape preferences as well as the means for realizing them.
12
 
  
                                                     
12
 The importance of shared expectations for cooperation underpins a literature that builds on Habermas’ (1981) conception 
of a “common lifeworld” (gemeinsame Lebenswelt), a supply of collective interpretations of the world provided by a 
common history or culture “to which actors can refer in their communications” (Risse 2000, p. 14). 
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Appendix I: 72 International Organizations (1950-2010) 
 
Acronym Name of IO General 
purpose IO 
in 2010 
Years in 
Dataset 
Andean /CAN  Andean Community  ✓ 42 
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation   20 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations  ✓ 44 
BENELUX  Benelux Community  ✓ 61 
BIS  Bank for International Settlements   61 
CABI  CAB international   24 
CARICOM  Caribbean Community  ✓  43 
CCNR  Central Commission for the Navigation of 
the Rhine  
 61 
CEMAC  Central African Economic & Monetary 
Union  
✓ 45 
CERN  European Organization for Nuclear Research   57 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States  ✓ 19 
CoE  Council of Europe   61 
COMESA  Common Market for East/Southern Africa  ✓ 29 
ComSec  Commonwealth of Nations  ✓ 46 
EAC  East African Community  ✓ 27 
ECCAS-CEEC  Economic Community of Central African 
States  
✓ 26 
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African 
States  
✓ 36 
EEA  European Economic Area   17 
EFTA  Euro Free Trade Association   51 
ESA  European Space Agency   31 
EU  European Union  ✓ 59 
FAO  Food & Agriculture Organization   61 
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council  ✓ 13 
GEF  Global Environmental Facility/ Fund   17 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency   54 
IBRD  World Bank   61 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization   61 
ICC  International Criminal Court   9 
IGAD  Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development  
✓ 25 
ILO  International Labour Organization   61 
IMF  International Monetary Fund   61 
IMO  International Maritime Organization   51 
INTERPOL  International Criminal Police Organization   61 
IOM  International Organization for Migration   56 
ISA/ISBA  International Seabed Authority   17 
ITU  International Telecommunication Union   61 
Iwhale  International Whaling Commission   61 
LAIA/ALADI  Latin American Integration Association   51 
LOAS  League of Arab States  ✓ 61 
MERCOSUR  Common Market of the South  ✓ 20 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Association   17 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization   61 
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NordC  Nordic Council  ✓ 59 
OAPEC  Organization of Arab Petroleum Export 
Countries  
 43 
OAS  Organization of American States  ✓ 60 
OAU/ AU  African Union  ✓ 48 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation & 
Development  
 61 
OECS  Organization of Eastern Caribbean States  ✓ 43 
OIC  Organization of the Islamic Conference  ✓ 41 
OIF/ACCT  Francophone Community   41 
OPEC  Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries  
 51 
OSCE  Organization for Security & Cooperation in 
Europe  
 38 
OTIF  Intergovernmental Organization for 
International Carriage by Rail  
 61 
PCA  Permanent Court of Arbitration   61 
PIF  Pacific Islands Forum  ✓ 36 
SAARC  South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation  
✓ 25 
SACU  Southern African Customs Union   42 
SADC  Southern African Development Community  ✓ 29 
SCO  Shanghai Cooperation Organization  ✓ 9 
SELA  Latin American Economic System   45 
SICA  Central American Integration System  ✓ 59 
SPC  South Pacific Community  ✓ 61 
UN  United Nations  ✓ 61 
UNESCO  UN Education, Scientific, & Cultural 
Organization  
 61 
UNIDO  UN Industrial Development Organization   26 
UNWTO  World Tourism Organization   36 
UPU  Universal Postal Union   61 
WCO  World Customs Organization   59 
WHO  World Health Organization   61 
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Organization   44 
WMO  World Meteorological Organization   61 
WTO  World Trade Organization   16 
Seventy of the 72 IOs in the dataset are in the Correlates of War (COW) Dataset (Pevehouse et al. 
2004). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the European Economic Area are not in the COW 
dataset, but meet five of the six criteria. IOs that do not meet the threshold but are in the COW dataset 
include the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations (AATPO), which lacks a 
permanent secretariat, an annual meeting, and a website (and is a subsidiary of the African Union); the 
Australia-New Zealand-US Treaty Organization (ANZUS), which has two members and does not have 
a permanent secretariat, webpage or address; the Arctic Council, which had until 2011 a rotating 
secretariat of very small size. Several COW-listed IOs are subsidiaries of other organizations, such as 
the Andean Parliament, a consultative body to the Andean Community; the Nordic Council of 
Ministers, an executive body of the Nordic Council; or the European Central Bank, a European Union 
institution. 
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Appendix II: Coding Policy Scope 
The policy portfolio of each IO was assessed by two independent coders with a list of 25 policies in 
hand. This list was adapted from a classification scheme initially developed for the European Union by 
Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), and updated by Philippe Schmitter (1996) and Liesbet Hooghe and 
Gary Marks (2001). Coders were asked to code the policy responsibility of each IO in two ways: a) in 
what policies does the IO have substantial involvement, and b) of these policies, which policy 
constitutes the core activity of the IO in 2010? The Krippendorff’s alpha among coders is 0.70, which 
indicates reasonably high intercoder reliability. 
  
1. Agriculture  
2. Competition policy, mergers, state aid, antitrust 
3. Culture and media  
4. Education (primary, secondary, tertiary), vocational training, youth  
5. Development, aid to poor countries 
6. Financial regulation, banking regulation, monetary policy, currency  
7. Welfare state services, employment policy, social affairs, pension systems  
8. Energy (coal, oil, nuclear, wind, solar) 
9. Environment: pollution, natural habitat, endangered species  
10. Financial stabilization, lending to countries in difficulty 
11. Foreign policy, diplomacy, political cooperation  
12. Fisheries and maritime affairs  
13. Health: public health, food safety, nutrition  
14. Humanitarian aid (natural or man−made disasters)  
15. Human rights: social & labor rights, democracy, rule of law, non−discrimination, election 
monitoring 
16. Industrial policy (including manufacturing, SMEs, tourism)  
17. Justice, home affairs, interior security, police, anti−terrorism  
18. Migration, immigration, asylum, refugees 
19. Military cooperation, defense, military security  
20. Regional policy, regional development, poverty reduction  
21. Research policy, research programming, science 
22. Taxation, fiscal policy coordination 
23. Telecommunications, internet, postal services 
24. Trade, customs, tariffs, intellectual property rights/ patents 
25. Transport: railways, air traffic, shipping, roads  
(26. Data collection, statistics, reports – coded separately) 
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